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Abstract
We try to perform geometrization of cognitive science and psychology
by representing information states of cognitive systems by points of mental
space given by a hierarchic m-adic tree. Associations are represented by
balls and ideas by collections of balls. We consider dynamics of ideas based
on lifting of dynamics of mental points. We apply our dynamical model for
modeling of flows of unconscious and conscious information in the human
brain. In a series of models, Models 1-3, we consider cognitive systems with
increasing complexity of psychological behavior determined by structure of
flows of associations and ideas.
Keywords: Mental space, hierarchic encoding of mental information, m-
adic trees and numbers, dynamical systems, conscious/unconscious flows of
information. neuronal trees, psychoanalysis
1 Introduction
One of the sources of the extremely successful mathematical formalization of
physics was creation of the adequate mathematical model of physical space,
namely, the Cartesian product of real lines. This provides the possibility
for “embedding” physical objects into a mathematical space. Coordinates of
physical systems are given by points of this space. Rigid physical bodies are
represented by geometric figures (cubes, balls,... ). By describing dynamics
of coordinates, e.g., with the aid of differential equations, we can describe
dynamics of bodies (from falling stones to Sputniks).
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In a series of works (Khrennikov, 1997, 1998a,b, 1999a,b, 2000a,b) there
was advocated a similar approach to description of mental processes in cog-
nitive sciences and psychology (and even information dynamics in genetics),
see also Albeverio et al., 1999, and Dubischar et al, 1999. Similar to physics,
the first step should be elaboration of a mathematical model of mental space.
We understood well that this is a problem of huge complexity and it might
take a few hundred years for creating an adequate mathematical model of
mental space. We recall that it took three hundred years to create a math-
ematically rigorous model of real physical space. In previous papers criti-
cal arguments were presented against the real model of space as a possible
candidate for a mental space. One of the main arguments was that the real
continuum is a continuous infinitely divisible space. Such a picture of space
is adequate to physical space (at least in classical physics), but mental space
is not continuous: mind is not infinitely divisible! Another problem with the
real continuum is that it is homogeneous: “all points of this space have equal
rights.” In opposition to such a homogeneity mental states have clearly ex-
pressed hierarchical structure, see for discussions: Hubel and Wiesel, 1962,
Smythies, 1970, Clark, 1980, Amit, 1989, Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 1991,
Khrennikov, 1997, 1998a,b, 1999a,b, 2000a, b; Albeverio et al., 1999; Dubis-
char et al, 1999, Voronkov, 2002a, b, Sergin, 2007, see also Bechterew, 1911,
Damasio et al., 1989, Fuster, 1997, for corresponding medical evidence.
Therefore a model of mental space that we are looking for should be (at
least) discontinuous and hierarchical. In mathematics there is a well known
class of spaces with such features. These are m-adic trees (here m is a nat-
ural number giving the number of branches of a tree at each vertex). It is
interesting that such trees are nicely equipped: there is a well defined alge-
braic structure which gives the possibility to add, subtract, multiply, and for
prime m (so m = 2, 3, 5, ..., 1997, 1999, ...) even divide branches of such a
tree. There is a natural topology on such trees encoding the hierarchic tree
structure. This topology is based on a metric, so called ultrametric. Thus m-
adic trees are not worse equipped than the real line. However, the equipment
– algebra and topology – is very different from the real one.
We proposed (see Khrennikov, 1997, 1998a,b, 1999a,b, 2000a,b; Albev-
erio et al., 1999; Dubischar et al, 1999) to choose m-adic trees as possible
models of mental space Xmental: points of this space are branches of a tree.
These are mental coordinates representing mental states. By using mental
coordinates we able to embed into the space mental analogs of physical rigid
bodies – associations and ideas. They are represented, respectively, by balls
and collections of balls in the ultrametric mental space.
Mental states (represented by branches) are basic cognitive mental im-
ages. An association connects a number of cognitive mental images. Thus
an association can be represented as a subset of the mental space. The cru-
cial point is that in our model the associative connection of cognitive mental
images is fundamentally hierarchical. Therefore an association is not an ar-
bitrary collection of cognitive mental images (not an arbitrary set of mental
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points), but a hierarchically coupled collection. Since in our model the men-
tal hierarchy is encoded by the topology of the mental space, it represents
the associative coupling of cognitive mental images into balls. A larger ball
couples together more cognitive mental images. Thus it is a more complex
association (but it is a “fuzzy-association,” it is not sharp). Decreasing of
ball’s radius induces decreasing of the complexity an association which is
represented by this ball. An association becomes sharper. In the limit we
obtain the ball of the zero radius. That is nothing else than a single mental
point (the center of such a degenerated ball). This is a single cognitive mental
image. This is the limiting case of an association: a cognitive mental image
is ”associated” with itself. We hope that such a limiting degeneration of an
association into a mental image would not be misleading for readers.
Ideas are identified as collections of associations, something analogous to
a coherent group of individuals in the biological analogy. The identification
of the fundamental structure as a mental image allows a concrete dynamical
model for ideas as collections of loosely bound associations. Association
is kind of atom of cognition from which more complex ideas are build like
molecules from atoms.
We mention also that a p-adic model (here m = p is a prime number) of
consciousness was (independently) proposed in Pitka¨nen, 1998. Pitka¨nen’s
approach was not based on encoding of mental hierarchy by p-adic numbers.
It has a deeper relation to foundations of physics, especially the quantum one.
Recently p-adic information space was used for genetic models, see Dragovich
et al., 2006, and Khrennikov, 2006a,b as well as Pitka¨nen, 2006. A new ex-
citing domain of research is use of ultrametric methods in data-analysis –
from astrophysics and computer science to biology, see, e.g., Murtagh, 2004.
In papers, Khrennikov, 1997, 1998a,b, 1999a,b; Albeverio et al., 1999;
Dubischar et al, 1999, we studied merely the dynamics of mental states –
mental images. We considered dynamical systems which work with mental
states. There is a nonlinear relation between input and output mental states,
xn+1 = f(xn), xn ∈ Xmental. (1)
The description of functioning of the human brain by dynamical systems
(feedback processes) is a well established approach. The main difference be-
tween our approach and the conventional dynamical approach to cognition
(see Ashby, 1952, van Gelder and Port, 1995, van Gelder, 1995, Strogatz,
1994, Eliasmith, 1996, Conte et al, 2006 – in the latter there was presented a
dynamical model of cognition exhibiting nondeterministic features similar to
those in quantum mechanics) is that in the conventional dynamical approach
dynamical systems work in the real physical space of electric potentials and
in our approach dynamical systems work in the m-adic mental space. There
is also a similarity between our approach and the artificial intelligence ap-
proach, Chomsky, 1963, Churchland and Sejnovski, 1992.
In the present paper we study dynamics of mental analogs of physical
rigid bodies – associations (balls in the mental metric space) and ideas (col-
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lections of balls). In spite of the fact that dynamics of associations and ideas
can be in principle reduced to dynamics of mental points composing those
“mental bodies”, the those dynamics exhibits their own interesting properties
which could not be seen on the level of pointwise dynamics.
We apply our dynamical model for modeling of flows of unconscious and
conscious information in the human brain.1
In series of models, Models 1-3, we consider cognitive systems with in-
creasing complexity of psychological behavior determined by structure of
flows of associations and ideas. Using this basic conceptual repertoire an in-
creasingly refined cognitive model is developed starting from an animal like
individual whose sexual behavior is based on instincts alone. At the first step
a classification of ideas to interesting and less interesting ones is introduced
and less interesting ideas are deleted. At the next level a censorship of dan-
gerous ideas is introduced and the conflict between interesting and dangerous
leads to neurotic behaviors, fix idees, and hysteria. As was pointed out by
one of referees of this paper, these aspects of the model reflect more the gen-
eral structure of conscious/unconscious processing rather than properties of
m-adic numbers. The basic mathematical structure for this model is men-
tal ultrametric space. In particular, ultrametric is used to classify ideas – to
assign to each idea its measures of interest and interdiction.
Finally, we apply our approach to mathematical modeling of Freud’s the-
ory, see, for example, Freud, 1933, of interaction between unconscious and
conscious domains. One of basic features of our model is splitting the pro-
cess of thinking into two separate (but at the same time closely connected)
domains: conscious and unconscious, cf. Freud, 1933. We shall use the
following point of view on the simultaneous work of the consciousness and
unconsciousness. The consciousness contains a control center CC that has
functions of control over results of functioning of subconsciousness. CC
formulates problems, and sends them to the unconscious domain. The pro-
cess of finding a solution is hidden in the unconscious domain. In the un-
conscious domain there work gigantic dynamical systems – thinking pro-
cessors. Each processor is determined by a function f from mental space
into itself (describing the corresponding feedback process – psychological
function). It produces iterations of mental states (points of mental space)
x1 = f(x0), ...., xn+1 = f(xn), ... These intermediate mental states are not
used by the consciousness. The consciousness (namely CC) controls only
some exceptional moments in the work of the dynamical system in the un-
conscious domain – attractors and cycles. Dynamics of mental points induce
dynamics of mental figures, in particular, ball-associations and, hence, ideas
(collections of balls). The crucial point is that behaviors of the dynamical
in the mental space and its lifting to spaces of associations and ideas can be
very different. Extremely cycling (chaotic) behavior on the level of mental
1We do not try to discuss general philosophical and cognitive problems of modeling of conscious-
ness, see, e.g., Blomberg et al. 1994, Baars, 1997, Pitka¨nen, 1998, Khrennikov, 1998a, 2004a.
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states can imply nice stabilization to attractors on the level of ideas.
To couple our hierarchic m-adic model of processing of information in
brain with other investigations in cognitive brain research, we can mention
e.g. the paper of Oztop et al, 2005, presenting an approach to “mental
state inference” (oriented toward visual feedback control). We remark that
”mental state inference”, more generally “theory of mind” has been a resent
topic of interest in cognitive neuroscience, see Blakemore and Decety, 2001,
Chaminade et al., 2001, Frith C.D. and Frith U., 1999. In fact, we present
a model of mental state inference serving for Freud’s psychoanalysis. Our
model is about estimation of mental states on the basis of symptoms (in the
mentioned papers mental states were estimated on the behavioral basis).
Geometrically we can imagine a system of m-adic integers (which will
be the mathematical basis of our cognitive models) as a homogeneous tree
with m-branches splitting at each vertex. The distance between mental states
is determined by the length of their common root: close mental states have
a long common root. The corresponding geometry strongly differs from the
ordinary Euclidean geometry.
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Figure 1: The 2-adic tree
We also point out that systems of m-adic numbers (restricted to m = p a
prime number) were intensively used in theoretical physics, see e.g. Khren-
nikov, 1997.
We remark that in this paper we do not consider in details the neuronal ba-
sis of the m-adic mental space, see Khrennikov 2004a, b, for corresponding
models, see section 5 for a brief review. This neuronal basis is provided by
consideration of hierarchical neuronal trees. Such trees provides connection
of the mental space (produced by a tree) with physical space (in that neu-
ronal trees are located). Mental processes are connected with physical and
chemical processes in the brain: mental states are produced as distributed
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activations of neuronal pathways. We remark that mental hierarchy was dis-
cussed a lot, see already mentioned papers Smythies, 1970, Clark, 1980,
Amit, 1989, Hubel and Wiesel, 1962, Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 1991, Ivan-
itsky, 1999, Watt and Phillips, 2000, Stringer and Rolls, 2002, Khrennikov,
1997, 1998a,b, 1999a,b, 2000a, b; Albeverio et al., 1999; Dubischar et al,
1999, Voronkov, 2002a, b, Sergin, 2007. However, there were not so much
experimental neurophysiological evidences of existence of such neuronal hi-
erarchical structures in the brain. Therefore the recent paper of Luczak et al.,
2007, that confirmed experimentally existence of neurons-directors which
rule the performances of cognitive tasks (under the same context and learn-
ing conditions) is extremely important for our model. The presence of a
complicated hierarchy of time scales in the brain can be considered as an
indirect confirmation of the hierarchical structure of processing of informa-
tion in the brain, see, e.g., Geissler et al (1978), Geissler and Puffe (1982),
Geissler (1983, 85, 87,92), Geissler and Kompass (1999, 2001), Geissler,
Schebera, and Kompass (1999), Klix and van der Meer (1978), Kristofferson
(1972, 80, 90), Bredenkamp (1993), Teghtsoonian (1971).
We start with recollection of the basic notions from e.g. Khrennikov,
1997, 1998a,b, 1999a,b, 2000a,b; Albeverio et al., 1999; Dubischar et al,
1999. Consequences for neurophysiology, neuroinformatics, and cognitive
sciences as well as for psychology and neuropsychology, and even medicine
and psychiatry will be presented in sections 11–13; possibilities to apply
our model for the project on artificial life will be considered in section 14
(“psychological robots”).
2 m-adic ultrametric spaces
The notion of a metric space is used in many applications for describing dis-
tances between objects. LetX be a set. A function ρ : X×X → R+ (where
R+ is the set of positive real numbers) is said to be a metric if it has the fol-
lowing properties: 1)ρ(x, y) = 0 iff x = y (non-degenerated); 2)ρ(x, y) =
ρ(y, x) (symmetric); 3)ρ(x, y) ≤ ρ(x, z)+ρ(z, y) (the triangle inequality).
The pair (X, ρ) is called a metric space.
We are interested in the following class of metric spaces (X, ρ). Every
point x has the infinite number of coordinates
x = (α1, ..., αn, ...) . (2)
Each coordinate yields the finite number of values,
α ∈ Am = {0, ...,m− 1}, (3)
where m > 1 is a natural number, the base of the alphabet Am. The metric ρ
should be so called ultrametric, i.e., satisfy the strong triangle inequality:
ρ(x, y) ≤ max[ρ(x, z), ρ(z, y)], x, y, z ∈ X. (4)
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The strong triangle inequality can be stated geometrically: each side of a
triangle is at most as long as the longest one of the two other sides. Such a
triangle is quite restricted when considered in the ordinary Euclidean space.
We denote the space of sequences (2), (3) by the symbol Zm. The stan-
dard ultrametric is introduced on this set in the following way. For two points
x = (α0, α1, α2, ...., αn, .....), y = (β0, β1, β2, ..., βn, ...) ∈ Zm,
we set
ρm(x, y) =
1
mk
if αj = βj , j = 0, 1, ..., k − 1, and αk 6= βk.
This is a metric and even an ultrametric. To find the distance ρm(x, y) be-
tween two strings of digits x and y we have to find the first position k such
that strings have different digits at this position.
Let (X, ρ) be an arbitrary ultrametric space. For r ∈ R+, a ∈ X, we set
Ur(a) = {x ∈ X : ρ(x, a) ≤ r}, U
−
r (a) = {x ∈ X : ρ(x, a) < r}.
These are balls of radius r with center a. Balls have the following properties,
Khrennikov, 1997:
1) Let U and V be two balls in X. Then there are only two possibilities:
(a) balls are ordered by inclusion (i.e., U ⊂ V or V ⊂ U ); (b) balls are
disjoint.2
2) Each point of a ball may serve as a centre.
3) In some ultrametric spaces a ball may have infinitely many radii.
Let m > 1 be the fixed natural number. We consider the m-adic metric
space (Zm, ρm). This metric space has the natural algebraic structure, see
Khrennikov, 1997.
A point x = (α0, α1, α2, ..., αn, ....) of the space Zm can be identified
with a so called m-adic number:
x = α0α1...αk.... ≡ α0 + α1m+ ...+ αkm
k + ... . (5)
The series (5) converges in the metric space Zm. In particular, a finite mental
string x = α0α1...αk can be identified with the natural number
x = α0 + α1m+ ...+ αkm
k.
Therefore the set of all finite mental strings can be identified with the set of
natural numbers N. So dynamics of finite mental strings can be simulated
via dynamics on N. Moreover, N is a dense subset of Zm : each x ∈ Zm
can be approximated with an arbitrary precision by natural numbers. Thus
the space m-adic numbers can be considered as an extension of the set of
natural numbers. By choosing different m we obtain in general different
extensions Zm. Therefore we can say that in our model mental states are
2There is the third possibility in the Euclidean space .
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encoded by natural numbers. However, the mental geometry on the set of
natural numbers differs crucially from the one which is induced from the real
line.
It is possible to introduce algebraic operations on the set of m-adic num-
bers Zm, namely addition, subtraction, and multiplication. These operations
are natural extensions by the m-adic continuity of the standard operations on
the set of natural numbers N = {0, 1, 2, 3, ...}.
3 Mental Space
We shall use the following mathematical model for mental space:
(1) Set-structure: The set of mental states Xmental has the structure of the
m-adic tree: Xmental = Zm.
(2) Topology: Two mental states x and y are close if they have sufficiently
long common root. This topology is described by the metric ρm.
In our mathematical model mental space is represented as the metric
space (Zm, ρm).
Dynamical thinking on the level of mental states is performed via the
following procedure: an initial mental state x0 is sent to the unconscious
domain; it is iterated by some dynamical system which is determined by a
map
f : Zm → Zm;
an attractor is communicated to the consciousness; this is the solution of a
problem x0.3 Our mathematical model is based on two cornerstones:
H). The first is the assumption that the coding system which is used by
the brain for recording vectors of information generates a hierarchical struc-
ture between digits of these vectors. Thus if x = (α1, α2, ..., αn, ...), αj =
0, 1, ...,m− 1, is an information vector which presents in the brain a mental
state then digits αj have different weights. The digit α0 is the most impor-
tant, α1 dominates over α2, ..., αn, ..., and so on.
D). The second is the assumption that functioning of the brain is not
based on the rule of reason. The unconsciousness is a collection of dynam-
ical systems fs(x) (thinking processors) which produce new mental states
practically automatically. The consciousness only uses and control results
(attractors in spaces of ideas) of functioning of unconscious processors.
3 It may be that iterations starting with some x0 will not arrive to any attractor. For example,
starting with x0, τ may perform a cyclic behavior in the process of thinking. In such case a cognitive
system τ would not find the definite solution of a problem. In particular, it is impossible to escape a
cyclic behavior on the level of mental states: even the simplest dynamical systems in Zm may have
a huge number of cycles, see Khrennikov, 1997.
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For a neuronal basis of the m-adic mental space, see Khrennikov 2004a,
b. We also mention the possibility to apply the hierarchic mental space to
genetics.
Example 3.1 (4-adic genetic information space) We may describe DNA
and RNA sequences by m-adic numbers. We present schematically devel-
opment of this model. DNA and RNA sequences are represented by 4-adic
numbers. Nucleotides are mapped to digits in registers of 4-adic numbers:
adenine - A, guanine - G, cytosine - C, and thymine - T are encoded by
α = 0, 1, 2, 3. The U -nucleotide is represented by 3. The DNA and RNA
sequences have the natural hierarchic structure: letters which are located
at the beginning of a chain are considered as more important. This hierar-
chic structure coincides with the hierarchic structure of the 4-adic tree. It
can also be encoded by the 4-adic metric. The process of DNA-reproduction
is described by action of 4-adic dynamical system. As we know, the genes
contain information for production of proteins. The genetic code is a de-
generate map of codons to proteins. We model this map as functioning of a
monomial 4-adic dynamical system. Proteins are attractors of this dynamical
system. We also can study the process the genom evolution in the framework
of 4-adic dynamical systems.
4 Associations and Ideas
We now improve this dynamical cognitive model on hierarchic mental trees
by introducing a new hierarchy: equivalence classes of mental states are
interpreted as associations, collections of associations as ideas.
A new property of dynamics of ideas is that (for a large class of dynamical
systems onm-adic trees) for each initial idea J0 its iterations are attracted by
some idea Jattr, see Khrennikov, 1997, 2004a, for mathematical details. The
latter idea is considered by the consciousness as a solution of the problem
J0. In the opposition to such an attractor-like dynamics of ideas, dynamics
of mental states (on the tree Xmental) or associations need not be attractive.
In particular, there can exist numerous cycles or ergodic evolution.
By using higher cognitive levels (associations and ideas) of the represen-
tation of information a cognitive system strongly improves the regularity of
thinking dynamics. Finally, we note that the use of a new cognitive hier-
archy (in combination with the basic hierarchy of the m-adic tree) strongly
improves the information power of a cognitive system.
Special collections of mental points form new cognitive objects, associ-
ations. Let s ∈ {0, 1, ...,m− 1}. A set
As = {x = (α0, ..., αk, ...) ∈ Zm : α0 = s}
is called an association of order 1. By realizingZm as the metric space we see
that As can be represented as the ball of radius r = 1m . Any point a having
α0 as the first digit can be chosen as a center of this ball (we recall that in an
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ultrametric space any point a belonging to a ball can be chosen as its center):
As = U 1
m
(a), where a = (a0, a1, ...), a0 = s. Associations of higher orders
are defined in the same way. Let s0, ..., sk−1 ∈ {0, 1, ...,m− 1}. The set
As0...sk = {x = (α0, ..., αk, ..) ∈ Zm : α0 = s0, ..., αk−1 = sk−1}
is called an association of order k. These are balls of the radius r = 1
mk
.
Denote the set of all associations by the symbolXA. Collections of asso-
ciations will be called ideas. Denote the set of all ideas by the symbol XID.
The space XID consists of points-associations.
In this section we study the simplest dynamics of associations and ideas
which are induced by corresponding dynamics of mental states,
xn+1 = f(xn). (6)
Suppose that, for each association, its image is again an association. Thus
f maps balls onto balls. Then dynamics (6) of mental states of τ induces
dynamics of associations
An+1 = f(An). (7)
We say that dynamics in the mental space Xmental for transformations is
lifted to the space of associations XA.
5 Neuronal Realization
Let us consider the simplest model of a neuronal tree Tneuronal inducing a
mental space Xmental. This model is based on the 2-adic neuronal tree given
by Figure 1. Each vertex of this tree corresponds to a single neuron. In this
idealized model each axon provides connections with precisely two neurons
of lower level of the hierarchy in the neuronal tree. There is the root-neuron
denoted by ⋆, its axon provides connections with the two neurons, 0 and 1, of
the lower level. Each of these neurons sends its axon to precisely two neurons
of the lower level and so on. Each branch n of this tree ( a hierarchical chain
of neurons) can be coded by a sequence of zeros/ones Thus this neuronal tree
can be mathematically represented as the set of 2-adic numbers: Tneuronal =
Z2.
Each branch of this neuronal tree is a device for producing mental states
(cognitive mental images). In the simplest model we suppose that each neu-
ron can be only in the two states: α = 1, firing, α = 0, non-firing. Thus
each branch produces (at some moment of time) a sequence of zeros/ones:
x = α0α1...αN ..., where αj = 0, 1. (In the mathematical model we can
consider infinitely long sequences). Thus the neuronal tree Tneuronal = Z2
produces the mental space Xmental = Z2. We can consider a mental field on
the neuronal tree Tneuronal. This is the map
ψ : Tneuronal → Xmental,
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mathematically:
ψ : Z2 → Z2, ψ(n) = x.
In fact, we need not assume that the 2-adic mental space should be based
on the 2-adic morphology of the neuronal tree. In general there is no direct
connection between the morphology of a the neuronal tree and the corre-
sponding mental space. Let us consider any tree Tneuronal with the root ⋆
(any number of edges leaving a vertex, so an axon can provide connections
with any number of neurons at the lower floor). Nevertheless, let us consider
the same firing/not coding system. Each branch of the neuronal tree Tneuronal
produces a 2-adic number. Here the mental field is a Z2-valued function on
Tneuronal. This is an important property of the model: it would be not so
natural to consider only homogeneous neuronal trees of the m-adic type.
The structure of the mental space is determined not by the morphology
of the neuronal tree, but by the coding system for states of neurons.
Let us consider more advanced system of coding based on frequencies of
spiking for neurons, e.g., Hoppensteadt, 1997. We assign to each neuron its
frequency of spiking:
α = k, for the frequency ν = 2πk
m
, k = 0, 1, ...,m− 1. (8)
Such a system of coding induces the m-adic mental space, Xmental = Zm
for any neuronal tree. Each mental function is based on its own neuronal
tree: Tneuronal = Tneuronal(f).
6 Model of Cognitive Psychology
We point out that the model which is developed in this paper is a model of
neuropsychology and not at all a model of neurophysiology. The neuronal
trees under consideration are not trees for integration-propagation of sen-
sory stimuli forming new mental categories at each level of such a tree (see
Khrennikov, 2002, for a general model). We consider neuronal trees creating
associations. As an example, let us consider a neuronal tree which is used
for representation of persons. There can be used various hierarchical repre-
sentations. We choose the ”sex-representation”: the state of the root-neuron,
⋆, gives the sex of a person: α0 = 1 – female, α0 = 0 – male. Consider a
branch of this tree. Suppose that in this representation the next neuron (after
⋆) gives the age of a person: α1 = 1 – young, α1 = 0 – not, and so on:
α2 = 1 – blond, α2 = 0 – not, α3 = 1 – high education/not,...
Take the ball U1/2 = {x = α0α1...αN ... : α0 = 1}. This is the associa-
tion of woman.
Take the ball U1/4 = {x = α0α1...αN ... : α0 = 1, α1 = 1}. This is the
association of young woman.
Take the ball U1/8 = {x = α0α1...αN ... : α0 = 1, α1 = 1, α2 = 1}.
This is the association of young blond woman.
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Take the ball U1/16 = {x = α0α1...αN ... : α0 = 1, α1 = 1, α2 =
1, α3 = 1}. This is the association of young blond woman with high educa-
tion.
Take now the ball V1/4 = {x = α0α1...αN ... : α0 = 0, α1 = 1}. This is
the association of young man.
Take the union of two balls-associations: W = U1/4 ∪ V1/4 = {x =
α0α1...αN ... : α1 = 1}. This is an idea of young person.
”Young person”, W, is an idea with respect to the hierarchy based on sex.
If we consider another hierarchy (based on another neuronal tree) for that the
root-neuron represents not sex, but age, then it produces ”young person” as
the association: Uage1/2 = {y = β0β1...βN ... : β0 = 1}.
But Uage1/2 is not completely the same mental object as W. The Uage1/2 is the
”unisex young person” and W ”young person with sex.”
We see that our considerations of changing of neuronal trees and hence
mental representations is similar to the choice of coordinate systems in physics.
As was remarked at the beginning of this section, dynamics of associ-
ations and ideas need not be based on external stimuli (sensor or mental).
Thus a neuronal tree can be self-activated even without signals from outside,
cf. with experimental results Luczak et al., 2007.
7 Dynamics of Associations and Ideas
Dynamics of associations (7) automatically induces dynamics of ideas
Jn+1 = f(Jn). (9)
Geometrically associations are represented as bundles of branches of the m-
adic tree. Ideas are represented as sets of bundles. Thus dynamics (6), (7),
(9) are, respectively, dynamics of branches, bundles and sets of bundles on
the m-adic tree. To give examples of f mapping balls onto balls, we use the
standard algebraic structure on Zm. For example, it is known, Khrennikov
1997, 2004a, that all monomial dynamical systems belong to this class.
We are interested in attractors of dynamical system (9) (these are ideas-
solutions). To define attractors in the space of ideasXID, we have to define a
convergence in this space. We must introduce a distance on the space of ideas
(sets of associations). Unfortunately there is a small mathematical complica-
tion. A metric on the space of points does not induce a metric on the space
of sets that provides an adequate description of the convergence of ideas. It
is more useful to introduce a generalization of metric, namely so called pseu-
dometric. 4 Hence dynamics of ideas is a dynamics not in a metric space, but
in more general space, so called pseudometric space.
4In fact, it is possible to introduce even a metric (Hausdorff’s metric) as people in general topol-
ogy do. However, it seems that this metric does not give an adequate description of dynamics of
associations and ideas.
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Let (X, ρ) be a metric space. The distance between a point a ∈ X and a
subset B of X is defined as
ρ(a,B) = inf
b∈B
ρ(a, b)
(if B is a finite set, then ρ(a,B) = minb∈B ρ(a, b)).
Denote by Sub(X) the system of all subsets of X. Hausdorff’s distance
between two sets A and B belonging to Sub(X) is defined as
ρ(A,B) = sup
a∈A
ρ(a,B) = sup
a∈A
inf
b∈B
ρ(a, b). (10)
If A and B are finite sets, then
ρ(A,B) = max
a∈A
ρ(a,B) = max
a∈A
min
b∈B
ρ(a, b).
Hausdorff’s distance ρ is not a metric on the set Y = Sub(X). In particular,
ρ(A,B) = 0 does not imply that A = B. Nevertheless, the triangle inequal-
ity ρ(A,B) ≤ ρ(A,C)+ ρ(C,B), A,B,C ∈ Y, holds true for Hausdorff’s
distance.
Let T be a set. A function ρ : T × T → R+ = [0,+∞) for which the
triangle inequality holds true is called a pseudometric on T ; (T, ρ) is called
a pseudometric space. Hausdorff’s distance is a pseudometric on the space
Y of all subsets of the metric space X ; (Y, ρ) is a pseudometric space. The
strong triangle inequality ρ(A,B) ≤ max[ρ(A,C), ρ(C,B)] A,B,C ∈ Y,
holds true for Hausdorff’s distance corresponding to an ultrametric ρ on X.
In this case Hausdorff’s distance ρ is an ultra-pseudometric on the set Y =
Sub(X).
8 Advantages of dynamical processing of associ-
ations and ideas
As was already mentioned, the main distinguishing feature of the dynamics
of associations and ideas are their regularity comparing with the dynamics
of mental states. Typically the dynamics of mental states is irregular. Nu-
merous cycles and ergodic components appear and disappear depending on
m. Moreover, dynamics on more complex mental spaces (larger m and more
floors for mental trees) is more irregular than dynamics on simpler mental
spaces. Thus cognitive systems having more complex brains would have
real problems with successive processing of information, i.e., with obtaining
attractors-solutions (of course, under the assumption that our model for the
hierarchical dynamical processing of mental information is adequate to the
functioning of the real brain).
Surprisingly such an irregularity for mental states induces the regular dy-
namics of associations and ideas, Khrennikov 1997, 2004a. Cycles of states
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disappear. They are hidden in balls-associations. Ergodic components are
also unified into balls-associations.
Thus by using the associative representation of mental information the
brain working as a collection of dynamical systems on hierarchical trees es-
sentially increases the regularity of information processing. By our model
primitive brains (having a few levels of mental hierarchy and rather weak
networks of connections between hierarchical levels) are fine by working
only with mental states. However, a more complex brains should form asso-
ciations to stabilize dynamical processing of information.
9 Transformation of unconscious mental flows into
conscious flows
We represent a few mathematical models of the information architecture of
conscious systems τ, cf., e.g., Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988, Edelman, 1989,
Voronkov, 2002a. We start with a quite simple model (Model 1). This model
will be developed to more complex models which describe some essential
features of human cognitive behavior. The following sequence of cognitive
models is related to the process of evolution of the mental architecture of
cognitive systems.
9.1 Model 1
A). The brain of τ is split into two domains: conscious and unconscious.
B). There are two control centers, namely a conscious control center CC
and an unconscious control center UC.
C). The main part of the unconscious domain is a processing domain Π.
Dynamical thinking processors π are located in Π.
In the simplest case the outputs of some group of thinking processors
π1un, . . . , π
n
un are always sent toUC and the outputs of another groupπ1c , . . . , πmc
are always sent to CC.5 The brain of τ works in the following way.
External information is transformed by CC into some problem-idea J0.
TheCC sends J0 to a thinking processor π located in the domainΠ. Starting
with J0, π produces via iteration J1, . . . , JN , . . . an idea-attractor J .
If π = πiun (one of the unconscious-output processors), then J is transmit-
ted to the control center UC. This center sends J as an initial idea J ′0 = J
to Π or to a physical (unconscious) performance. In the first case some π′
(it can be conscious - output as well as unconscious - output processor) per-
forms iterations J ′0, J ′1, . . . , J ′N , . . . and produces a new idea-attractor J ′. In
the second case J is used as a signal to some physiological system.
5Information produced by piun cannot be directly used in the conscious domain. This informa-
tion circulates in the unconscious domain. Information produced by pic can be directly used in the
conscious domain.
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If π=πic (one of conscious-output processors), then J is transmitted to
the control center CC. This center sends J as an initial idea J ′0 = J to Π
(to some π′) or to a physical or mental performance (speech, writing), or
to memory. There is no additional analysis of an idea-attractor J which is
produced in the unconscious domain. Each attractor is recognized by the
control center CC as a solution of the initial problem J0, compared with
models 2-4.
Moreover, it is natural to assume that some group of thinking processors
π1Π, . . . , π
l
Π have their output only inside the processing domain Π. An at-
tractor J produced by πΠ is transmitted neither to CC nor to UC. The J is
directly used as the initial condition by some processor π. Finally, we obtain
the mental architecture of a brain given by Figure 2.
In this model CC sends all ideas obtained from the unconscious domain
to realization: mental or physical performance, memory recording, transmis-
sion to Π for a new cycle of the process of thinking. If the intensity of the
flow of information from the unconscious domain is rather high, then such a
τ can have problems with realizations of some ideas.
Example 9.1. (Primitive love). Let τ be a ‘man’ described by this model
and let π = πsex be his sexual thinking system. The image J0 of a woman γ
is sent byCC to πsex. This thinking block performs iterations J0, J1, . . . , JN
and produces an idea - attractor J . In the simplest case we have the pathway:
CC → πsex → CC (in principle, there could be extremely complex and long
pathways, for example, CC → πsex → π′ → π′′ → UC → π′′′ → CC).
Suppose that the idea Jlove = (love γ) is the attractor for iterations starting
with the image J0 of a woman. Then Jlove is sent directly to realization.
Thus τ has no doubts and even no craving. He performs all orders of the
unconscious domain. In fact, CC can be considered as a simple control
device performing the connection with the external world. The τ could not
have mental problems. The only problem for τ is an intensive flow of images
of women. This problem can be solved if τ collects images and then chooses
randomly an image for realization.
The reader may ask: Why does such a cognitive system τ need to split
mental processing into conscious and unconscious domains? The main con-
sequence of this splitting is that the τ does not observe iterations of dynam-
ical systems performing intensive computations. The consciousness, CC,
pays attention only to results (attractors) of functioning of thinking proces-
sors. As a consequence, the τ is not permanently disturbed by these itera-
tions. It can be concentrated on processing of external information and final
results of the process of thinking.
Besides the unconscious control centerUC and the processing domainΠ,
the unconscious domain contains some other structures (empty boxes of this
picture). These additional structures (in the conscious as well as unconscious
domains) will be introduced in more complex models. We shall also de-
scribe the character of connections between CC andUC. In general we need
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Figure 2: Model 1 of conscious/unconscious functioning
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not assume the specialization of processors π in Π : (π1c , . . . , πmc ) → CC,
(π1un, . . . , πnun)→ UC, (π1Π, . . . , πlΠ)→ (π1Π, . . . , πlΠ).
9.2 Model 2
One of the possibilities to improve functioning of τ is to create a queue
of ideas J waiting for a realization. Thus it is natural to assume that the
conscious domain contains some collector Q in that all ‘waiting ideas’ are
gathered.
Ideas in Q must be ordered for successive realizations. The same order
structure can be used to delete some ideas if Q is complete. Thus all con-
scious ideas must be classified.
They obtain some characteristics I(J) that gives a measure of interest to
an idea J . We may assume that I takes values in some segment [δ, 1] (in
the m-adic model δ = 1/2, see Remark 9.1). If I(J) = 1, then an idea
J is extremely interesting for τ. If I(J) = δ, then τ is not at all interested
in J. There exists a threshold Irz of the minimal interest for realization. If
I(J) < Irz, then the control centerCC directly deletes J, despite the fact that
J was produced in the unconscious domain as the solution of some problem
J0. If I(J) ≥ Irz, then CC sends the idea J to Q.
The τ lives in the continuously changed environment. The τ could not be
concentrated on realization of only old ideas J even if they are interesting.
Realizations of new ideas which are related to the present instant of time t
can be more important. The time-factor must be taken into account.
Let l(t), l(0) = 1, be some function (depending on τ ) which decreases
with the increasing of time t. Suppose that the interest I(t, J) of an idea J
in the queue Q evolves as
I(t, J) = l(t− t0) I(J) ,
where I(J) is the value of interest of J at the instant t0 of the arrival to the
collector Q. Thus the interest to J is continuously decreasing. Finally, if
I(t, J) becomes less than the realization threshold Irz the J is deleted from
Q.
Quick reactions to new circumstances can be based on an exponentially
decreasing coefficient l(t) : l(t) = e−Ct, where a constant C > 0 depends
on τ.6 If an idea J has an extremely high value of interest I(J) ≥ I+ (where
I+ is a preserving threshold), then it must be realized in any case. In our
model we postulate that if I(J) ≥ I+, the interest to J is not changed with
time: I(t, J) = I(J). 7 We note that, of course, I+ ≥ Irz.
6It may be that the level of interest of J evolves in a more complex way. For example, I(t, J) =
exp{−C(J)t}I(J). Here different ideas J have different coefficients C(J) of decreasing interest.
7For example I(t, J) = exp{−C(J)t}I(J), where C(J) = 0 for I(J) ≥ I+. So C(J) =
α θ(I+ − I(J)), where α > 0 is a constant (parameter of the brain) and θ is a Heavyside function:
θ(t) = 1, t ≥ 0, and θ(t) = 0, t < 0.
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We now describe one of the possible models for finding the value I(J)
of interest for an idea J .
The conscious domain contains a databaseDi of ideas which are interest-
ing for τ . A part of this database Di was created in the process of evolution.
It is transmitted from generation to generation (perhaps even DNA?). A part
of the Di is continuously created on the basis of τ ’s experience.
The conscious domain contains a special block, comparator, COMc that
measures the distance between two ideas, ρ(J1, J2), and the distance be-
tween an idea J and the set Di of interesting ideas: ρ(J,Di).
At the present level of development of neurophysiology we cannot spec-
ify a mental distance ρ. Moreover, such a distance may depend on a cognitive
system or class of cognitive systems. The hierarchic structure of the process
of thinking gives some reasons to suppose that COMc might use the m-adic
pseudometric ρm on the space of ideas XID. Thus the reader may assume
that everywhere below ρ is generated by the m-adic metric. However, all
general considerations are presented for an arbitrary metric.
We recall that the distance between a point b and a finite set A is defined
as ρ(b, A) = mina∈A ρ(b, a). If J is close to some interesting idea L0 ∈ Di,
then ρ(J,Di) is small. In fact, we have ρ(J,Di) ≤ ρ(J, L0), L0 ∈ Di. If J
is far from all interesting ideas L ∈ Di, then ρ(J,Di) is large. We define a
measure of interest I(J) as
I(J) =
1
1 + ρ(J,Di)
.
Thus, I(J) is large if ρ(J,Di) is small; I(J) is small if ρ(J,Di) is large.
Remark 9.1. (The range of interest in the m-adic model). Suppose that
the distance ρ is bounded from above:
sup
J1,J2
ρ(J1, J2) ≤ C, J1, J2 ∈ XID.
Then I(J) ≥ δ = 11+C . In such a case ‘I(J) is very small’ if I(J) ≈ δ. The
function I(J) takes values in the segment [δ, 1] (we remark that if ρ(J,Di) =
0, then I(J) = 1). Let ρ be Hausdorff’s pseudometric induced on the space
of ideas XID by the m-adic metric ρm. We have ρ(J1, J2) ≤ 1 for every
pair of ideas J1, J2. Here δ = 1/2 and I(J) always belongs to [1/2, 1]. The
sentence ‘I(J) is very small’ means that I(J) ≈ 1/2 and, as always, ‘I(J)
is very large’ means that I(J) ≈ 1.
There should be a connection between the level I(J) of interest and the
strength of realization of J . Signals for mental or physical performances of
J increase with increasing of I(J). If, for example, the idea J = {to beat
this person} then the strength of the beat increases with increasing of I(J).
In the process of memory recording the value of I(J) also plays an im-
portant role. It is natural to suppose that in working memory the evolution of
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the quantity I(t, J) is similar to the evolution which was considered in Q :
I(t, J) = lmem(t− t0)I(J), where lmem(0) = 1 and lmem(t) decreases with
increasing of t. If I(t, J) becomes less than the memory preserving threshold
Imem
−
, then J is deleted from working memory.
Example 9.2. (Love with interest). Let τ be a ‘man’ described by Model
2. In the same way as in Example 9.1 the image J0 of a woman γ may pro-
duce the idea Jlove = (love γ). However, Jlove is not sent to realization
automatically. The COMc measures ρ(Jlove, Di). Suppose that the database
Di of interesting ideas contains the idea (image) Lblond =(blond woman). If
γ is blond, then ρ(Jlove, Di) is small. So I(Jlove) is large and CC sends
Jlove to realization. However, if γ is not blond, then Jlove is deleted (de-
spite the unconscious demand Jlove). Of course, the real situation is more
complicated. Each τ has his canonical image Lblond. As Jlove = Jlove;γ
depends on γ, distance ρ(Jlove, Di) can be essentially different for different
women γ. Thus, for one blond woman γ, I(Jlove) ≥ Irz, but for another
blond woman γ, I(Jlove) < Irz. If there are few blond women γ1, . . . , γl
with I(Jlove;γj) ≥ Irz, then all ideas Jlove;γj are collected in Q. The queue
of blond women is ordered in Q due to values I(Jlove;γj). If, for some γ,
I(Jlove;γ) ≥ I+, then the level of interest toward Jlove;γ will not decrease
with time. The level of I(Jlove;γ) determines the intensity of realization of
love with γ.
The mental architecture of ‘brain’ in Model 2 is given by Figure 3: A
new block COMc in the conscious domain measures the distance between
an idea-attractor J which has been produced in the unconscious domain and
the database Di of interesting ideas. This distance determines the level of
interest for J : I(J) = 1/(1 + ρ(J,Di)). Ideas waiting for realization,
J1, . . . , Js, are collected in the special collector Q. They are ordered by
values of I(J) : I(J1) ≥ I(J2) ≥ . . . ≥ I(Js) ≥ I+. If I(J) ≥ I+
(where I+ is the preserving threshold), then the value of interest of J does
not decrease with time.
9.3 Model 3
The life of τ described by Model 2 is free of contradictions. The τ is always
oriented to realizations of the most interesting ideas, wishes, desires. How-
ever, environment (and, in particular, social environment) produces some
constraints to realizations of some interesting ideas.
In a mathematical model we introduce a new quantity F (J) which de-
scribes a measure of interdiction for an idea J .
It can be again assumed thatF (J) takes values in the segment [δ, 1]. Ideas
J with small F (J) have low levels of interdiction. If F (J) ≈ δ, then J is
a ‘free idea’. Ideas J with large F (J) have high levels of interdiction. If
F (J) ≈ 1, then J is totally forbidden.
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The interdiction function is computed in the same way as the interest
function. The conscious domain contains a database Df of forbidden ideas.
The comparator COMc measures not only the distance ρ(J,Di) between an
idea-attractor J (which has been transmitted to the conscious domain from
the unconscious domain) and the set of interesting idea Di, but also the dis-
tance ρ(J,Di) between an idea-attractor J and the set of forbidden ideas
Df :
ρ(J,Df) = min
L∈Df
ρ(J, L).
If J is close to some forbidden idea L0, then ρ(J,Df) is small. If J is far
from all forbidden ideas L ∈ Df , then ρ(J,Df ) is large.
We define a measure of interdiction F (J) as
F (J) =
1
1 + ρ(J,Df)
.
F (J) is large if ρ(J,Df) is small and F (J) is small if ρ(J,Df ) is large.
For the m-adic metric, ρ(J1, J2) ≤ 1. Thus F (J) ≥ 1/2. So F takes
values in the segment [1/2, 1].Here the sentence ‘F (J) is very small’ means
that F (J) ≈ 1/2 and ‘F (J) is very large’ means that F (J) ≈ 1.
The control center CC must take into account not only the level of inter-
est I(J) of an idea J but also the level of interdiction F (J) of an idea J . The
struggle between interest I(J) and interdiction F (J) induces all essential
features of human psychology. We consider a simple model of such a strug-
gle. For an idea J, we define consistency (between interest and interdiction)
as T (J) = aI(J) − bF (J), where a, b > 0 are some weights depending
on a cognitive system τ. Some τ could use more complex functionals for
consistency. For example,
T (J) = aIα(J) − bIβ(J) , (11)
where α, β > 0, are some powers. There exists a threshold of realization Trz
such that if T (J) ≥ Trz, then the idea J is sent to the collector Q for ideas
waiting for realization. If T (J) < Trz, then the idea J is deleted.
It is convenient to consider a special block in the conscious domain, an-
alyzer, ANc.
This block contains the comparator COMc which measures distances
ρ(J,Di) and ρ(J,Df); a computation device which calculates measures of
interest I(J), interdiction F (J) and consistency T (J) and checks the con-
dition T (J) ≥ Trz; a transmission device which sends J to Q or trash. The
order in the queue Q is based on the quantity T (J). It is also convenient to
introduce a block SERc, server, in the conscious domain which orders ideas
in Q with respect to values of consistency T (J).
We can again assume that there exists a threshold T+ such that ideas J
with T (J) ≥ T+ must be realized in any case. This threshold plays the
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important role in the process of the time evolution of consistency T (t, J) of
an idea J in Q: T (t, J) = l(t−t0) T (J),where the coefficient l(t) decreases
with increasing of t. Moreover, T (t, J) = T (J) if T (J) ≥ T+. We note that
T+ ≥ Trz. It can be that interest and interdiction evolve in different ways:
I(t, J) = li(t − t0)I(J) and F (t, J) = lf (t − t0)F (J). Here T (t, J) =
aI(t, J)− bF (t, J). Such a model is more realistic. A pessimist has quickly
decreasing function li(t) and slowly decreasing function lf(t). An optimist
has slowly decreasing function li(t) and quickly decreasing function lf (t).
Example 9.3. (Harmonic love). Let τ be a ‘man’ described by Model
3. The image J0 of a woman γ is transformed by πsex into the idea Jlove,γ .
Suppose that as in Example 1.2,Di containsLblond and γ is blond. However,
Jlove,γ is not sent automatically to the queue of ideas waiting for realization.
The idea Jlove,γ must be compared with the database Df of forbidden ideas.
Suppose that the idea-image Gtall = (tall woman) belongs to Df . If γ is tall,
then F (Jlove) is quite large. The future of Jlove depends on the value of the
consistency functional T (J) (the relation between coefficients a, b in (11)
and values I(J), F (J)). However, this process still does not induce doubts
or mental problems.
It seems that the consistency T (J) does not determine the intensity of
realization of J . An extremely interesting idea is not realized with strength
that is proportional to the consistency magnitude T (J). In fact, it is realized
with strength that is proportional to the magnitude of interest I(J). More-
over, larger interdiction also implies larger strength of realization. It seems
natural to connect strength of realization with the quantity
S(J) = c I(J) + d F (J) ,
where c, d > 0 are some parameters of the brain.
We call S(J) strength of an idea J. In particular, S(J) may play an im-
portant role in memory processes. We introduce a preserving thresholdSmem
−
(compare with the preserving threshold Imem
−
in model 2). The strength
S(t, J) of an idea J in the working memory evolves as
S(t, J) = lmem(t− t0)S(J),
where lmem is a decreasing function. If S(t, J) < Smem− , then at the instance
of time t the idea J is deleted from working memory.
The structure of analyzer is given by Figure 4.
A cognitive system τ described by Model 3 has complex cognitive be-
havior. However, this complexity does not imply ‘mental problems’. The
use of consistency functional T (J) solves the contradiction between interest
and interdiction.
The main disadvantage of the cognitive system τ described by Model
3 is that the analyzer ANc permits the realization of ideas J which have
at the same time very high levels of interest and interdiction (if I(J) and
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F (J) compensate each other in the consistency function). For example, let
T (J) = I(J)− F (J). If the realization threshold Trz = 0 the analyzer ANc
sends to the collector Q totally forbidden ideas J (with F (J) ≈ 1) having
extremely high interest (I(J) ≈ 1).
Such a behavior (‘a storm of cravings’) can be dangerous (especially in a
group of cognitive systems with a social structure). Therefore functioning of
the analyzer ANc must be based on more complex analysis of J which is not
reduced to the calculation of T (J) and testing T (J) ≥ Trz.
9.4 Model 4
Suppose that a cognitive system described by Model 3 improves its brain by
introducing two new thresholds Imax and Fmax. If I(J) ≥ Imax, then the
idea J is extremely interesting: τ can not simply delete J . If F (J) ≥ Fmax,
then an idea J is strongly forbidden: τ can not simply send J to Q.
If J belongs to the ‘domain of doubts’
Od = {J : I(J) ≥ Imax}
⋂
{J : F (J) ≥ Fmax}
the τ cannot take automatically (on the basis of the value of the consistency
T (J)) the decision on realization of J .
Example 9.4. (Forbidden love). Let τ be a ‘man’ described by Model 4.
Here the image J0 of a woman γ contains not only the spatial image of γ,
but also her social image. Suppose that the integral image J0 is transformed
by the thinking block πsex in the idea-attractor Jlove. Suppose that, as in all
previous examples, the image Lblond belongs to Di. Suppose that idea Gsoc
=(low social level) belongs to Df . Suppose that both ρ(Jlove, Lblond) and
ρ(Jlove, Gsoc) are very small. She is blond and poor! So I(Jlove) ≥ Imax
(high attraction of the woman γ for the τ ) and at the same time F (Jlove) ≥
Fmax (social restrictions are important for the τ ). In such a situation the τ
cannot take any decision on the idea Jlove.
10 Hidden Forbidden Wishes, Psychoanalysis
10.1 Hidden forbidden wishes, ide`e fixe
On one hand, the creation of an additional block in analyzer ANc to perform
(Imax, Fmax) analysis plays the positive role. Such a τ does not realize auto-
matically (via condition T (J) ≥ Trz) dangerous ideas J , despite their high
attraction. On the other hand, this step in the cognitive evolution induces
hard mental problems for τ . In fact, the appearance of the domain of doubts
Od in the mental space is the origin of many psychical problems and mental
diseases.
Let ANc find that idea J belongs to Od. The τ is afraid to realize J as
well as to delete J. The control center CC tries to perform further analysis of
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such a J . CC sends J to the processing domain Π as the initial problem for
some processor π1. If it produces an idea-attractor J1 which does not belong
to Od, then the τ can continue normal cognitive functioning. However, if π1
produces again an idea J1 which belongs Od, then CC must continue the
struggle against this doubtful idea. In the process of such a struggle CC and
some processors π, π1, π2, . . . are (at least partially) busy. An essential part
of mental resources of τ is used not for reactions to external signals, but for
the struggle with ideas J belonging to Od.
Typically this is a struggle with just one ide`e fixe J, see Freud, 1933.
We can explain the origin of such an ide`e fixe by our cognitive model. If
an idea J belonging to Od has been produced by the processor π, then it is
natural that CC will try again to use the same processor π for analyzing the
idea J . As fpi(J) = J (the J is a fixed point of the map fpi), then π starting
with J will always produce the same idea J (with the trivial sequence of
iterations J, J, . . . , J). In general the doubtful idea J can be modified by CC
(for example, on the basis of new information), J → Jmod. An idea Jmod
can be considered as a perturbation of J : ρ(J, Jmod) < s, where s is some
constant. If s > 0 is relatively small (so that Jmod still belongs to the basis
of attraction of J), then iterations Jmod, J1mod = fpi(Jmod), . . . , JNmod =
fNpi (Jmod), . . . again converge to the J .
How can CC stop this process of the permanent work with ide`e fixe J?
The answer to this question was given in Freud, 1933: investigations of
roots of hysterias and some other mental problems. By Freud ide`e fixe J is
shackled by CC into the unconscious domain.
In our model, the unconscious domain contains (besides the processing
domain Π and the unconscious control center UC) a special collector Dd for
doubtful ideas, forbidden wishes. After a few attempts to transform an idea J
belonging to the domain of doubtful ideas Od into some non-doubtful idea,
CC sends J to Dd. We remark that the domain Od is a mental domain (a set
of ideas) and Dd is a ‘hardware domain’ (a set of chains of neurons used for
saving of doubtful ideas).
What can we say about the further evolution of a doubtful idea J in the
collector Dd? It depends on a cognitive system τ (in particular, a human
individual). In the ‘purely normal case’ the collector Dd plays just the role
of a churchyard for doubtful ideas. Such a Dd has no output connections and
idea J will disappear after some period of time.
10.2 Symptoms
However, Freud demonstrated (on the basis of hundreds of cases) that ad-
vanced cognitive systems (such as human individuals) could not have ‘purely
normal behavior’. They could not perform the complete interment of doubt-
ful ideas in Dd.
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In our model, the collector Dd has an output connection with the uncon-
scious control center UC. At this moment the existence of such a connection
seems to be just a disadvantage in the mental architecture of τ . It seems that
such a cognitive system τ was simply not able to develop a physical system
for 100%-isolation of the collector Dd. However, later we shall demonstrate
that the pathway
CC → Dd → UC → CC (12)
has important cognitive functions. In fact, such a connection was specially
created in the process of evolution. But we start with the discussion on neg-
ative consequences of (12). Here we follow Freud, 1933.
In our mathematical model of Freud’s theory of unconscious mind, an
idea J ∈ Dd is sent to UC. The unconscious control center UC sends J to
one of the thinking processors ξ in Π. ξ performs iterations starting with J
as an initial idea. ξ produces an idea-attractor J˜ = limN→∞ JN , J0 = J.
In the simplest case ξ sends the idea-attractor J˜ to the conscious domain.
The ANc analyzes idea J˜ . If J˜ 6∈ Od, then ANc sends J˜ to the collector Q
(of ideas waiting for realization). 8 After some period of waiting J˜ is sent
to realization. 9 By such a realization CC deletes J from the collector Q.
However, CC does not delete the root of J˜ , namely J , because J is located
in the unconscious domain and CC is not able to control anything in this
domain. The idea J˜ is nothing other than a performance of the forbidden
wish J . Such unconscious transformations of forbidden wishes were studied
by Freud (see Freud, 1933, for examples).
We note that if UC sends a hidden forbidden wish J to the same thinking
processor π which has already generatedJ forCC, then (by the same reasons
as in our previous considerations) CC will again obtain the same doubtful
idea J . Such a continuous reproduction of ide`e fixe can take place. This
is the root of obstinate doubtful wishes. This can imply mental deceases,
because CC could not stop the struggle with ide`e fixe even by sending it to
Dd. However, UC may send J to another thinking processor ξ 6= π. Here
the idea-attractor J˜ (which has been produced starting with J as the initial
condition) differs from J . This is the real transformation of the forbidden
wish. In general a new wish J˜ has no direct relation to the original wish J .
This is nothing but a symptom of cognitive system τ , Freud, 1933.
Starting with an initial idea J0 a processor π produces an attractor J ;
analyzer ANc computes quantities I(J), F (J) (measures of interest and in-
terdiction for the idea J); ANc considers J as a doubtful idea: both measures
of interest and interdiction are too high, I(J) ≥ Imax, F (J) ≥ Fmax; ANc
sends J to the collector of doubtful ideas Dd; J moves from Dd to UC; UC
8Of course, there may exist more complex pathways: CC → Dd → UC → ξ → ξ1 . . . →
ξm → UC → λ → λ1 → . . . → λk → ANc → Q → CC, where ξ, ..., ξm, λ, ..., λk are some
thinking processors.
9Of course, idea J˜ may be simply deleted in Q if there are too many ideas in the queue and the
strength S(J˜) of J˜ is not so large.
25
sends it to some processor ξ; ξ produces an attractor J˜ . Analyzer ANc can
recognize J˜ as an idea which could be realized (depending on the distances
ρ(J˜ , Di) and ρ(J˜ , Df)) and send J˜ via the collector Q to realization. This J˜
is a symptom induced by J (in fact, by the initial idea J0).
10.3 Hysteric reactions
In general a doubtful idea J ∈ Dd is not only transferred into some symp-
tom J˜ , but it may essentially disturb functioning of the brain. Some thinking
blocks πΠ are directly connected to other thinking blocks. Suppose that, for
example, the following pathway is realized: J ∈ Dd → UC → πΠ → πc →
CC. Suppose also that ideas λ produced by πΠ play the role of parameters
for the block πc : xn+1 = fpic(xn, λ). Let CC obtain an image J0 and
send it to πc. However, instead of the normal value of the parameter λ, the
πΠ sends to πc some abnormal value λab induced by the hidden forbidden
wish J . The πc produces an attractor Lab which may strongly differ from
the attractor Lnorm corresponding to λnorm, the value of the parameter pro-
duced by the processor πΠ for the processor πc in the absence of the hidden
forbidden wish J.
In such a way we explain, for example, hysteric reactions. A rather
innocent initial stimulus J0 can induce via interference with a doubtful idea
J ∈ Dd inadequate performance Lab. We can also explain why hidden
forbidden wishes may induce physical diseases. Attempting to transform
J ∈ Dd into an idea which does not induce doubts and reflections, UC
can send J to some thinking processor πphys that is responsible for some
physical activity of τ . We note that UC considers J as just a collection of
mental states. This collection of mental states has different interpretations in
different thinking systems. In particular, J can correspond in πphys to some
‘bad initial condition’. The corresponding attractor Lphys can paralyze the
physical function ruled by πphys.
10.4 Feedback control based on doubtful ideas
A cognitive system τ wants to prevent a new appearance of forbidden wishes
J (collected in Dd) in the conscious domain. The brain of τ has an addi-
tional analyzer ANd (located in the unconscious domain) that must analyze
nearness of an idea attractor L produced by some processor πc and ideas J
belonging to the collector of doubtful ideas Dd.
In our model, it is supposed that each hidden forbidden wish Jfd in
the collector Dd still remembers a thinking block π which has produced
Jfd. This simply means that each idea Jfd in the Dd has the label π. Thus
Jfd = Jfd(π) ∈ Dd is not just a collection of mental states. There is in-
formation that these states are related to the dynamical system π. The set of
doubtful ideasO which are collected in the collectorDd can be split into sub-
sets O(π) of forbidden wishes corresponding to different thinking systems
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π. ANd contains a comparator COMd that measures the distance between
an idea-attractor J which has been produced by a thinking block π and the
set O(π) : ρ(J,O(π)) = minJfd∈O(pi) ρ(J, Jfd) . Then ANd calculates the
measure of interdiction
Fd(J) =
1
1 + ρ(J,O(π))
.
If Fd(J) is large (≈ 1), then an idea J is too close to one of former hidden
forbidden π-wishes. This idea should not be transmitted to the conscious
domain.
Each individual τ has its own blocking threshold Fbl: if Fd(J) < Fbl,
then J is transmitted; if Fd(J) ≥ Fbl, then J is deleted. In the latter case
J will never come to the conscious domain.10 This threshold Fbl determines
the degree of blocking of the thinking processor π by forbidden wishes. For
some individuals (having rather small values of Fbl), a forbidden wish Jfd
belonging to the set O(π) may stop the flow of information from π to the
conscious domain. The same Jfd may play a negligible role for individuals
having rather large magnitude of Fbl. Therefore the blocking threshold Fbl
is one of the important characteristics to distinguish normal and abnormal
behaviors. We note that Fbl depends on a thinking block π: Fbl = Fbl(π).
Thus the same individual τ can have the normal threshold for one thinking
block π, relatively large Fbl(π), and abnormal degree of blocking for another
thinking block π′, relatively small Fbl(π′).
Analyzer ANd computes the distance between the idea-attractor J (pro-
duced by a thinking block π) and the domain O(π) of hidden forbidden π-
wishes. If this distance is relatively small, i.e., the measure of interdiction
Fd(J) is relatively large, then J does not go to the conscious domain.
11 Consequences for neurophysiology, neuroin-
formatics and cognitive sciences
11.1 Hierarchical models of cognition
Such models (especially for the visual system) were discussed in a number of
works: Hubel and Wiesel, 1962, Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 1991, Ivanitsky,
1999, Watt and Phillips, 2000, Stringer and Rolls, 2002, Khrennikov, 1997,
1998a,b, 1999a,b, 2000a, b; Albeverio et al., 1999; Dubischar et al, 1999,
Voronkov, 2002a, b, Sergin, 2007.
However, the hierarchical approach has not yet become commonly ac-
cepted in neurophysiology, neuroinformatics and cognitive sciences. Our
mathematical model is fundamentally hierarchical. We were able to encode
10Analysis in the conscious domain could demonstrate that T (J) ≥ Trz and I(J) <
Imax, F (J) < Fmax. In the absence of hidden forbidden wishes J would be realized.
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hierarchy (both neuronal and mental) into the ultrametric geometry. Creation
of a simple model of hierarchical mental space (which has natural coupling
with the neuronal structure of the brain) provides a mathematical basis of the
hierarchical approach to brain’s functioning.
On the one hand, our model needs further justification from experimen-
tal neurophysiology. Unfortunately, at the moment there is no general con-
sensus on the presence of hierarchical neuronal trees in the brain. The ex-
perimental research is characterised by diversity of opinions. Mathematical
self-consistency of our hierarchical model might become a good stimulus for
further research in neurophysiology, neuroinformatics and cognitive sciences
to study the hierarchy of the brain, its functioning, cognition.
On the other hand, there was created a number of theoretical hierarchical
models for processing of information in the brain, . However, these models
were presented not on the level of mathematical modeling. It might be possi-
ble to use our mathematical formalism to present the mentioned approaches
on the mathematical level.
11.2 The problem of localization of mental functions
This problem has been the source of permanent discussions in neurophysi-
ology, neuroinformatics and cognitive sciences for more than one hundred
years, see, e.g., Damasio, 2005, for discussions and references. Our mathe-
matical model combines peacefully the views of both parties: the adherents
of the localization hypothesis as well as the adherents of the non-localization
hypothesis.
On the one hand, in our model each mental function f is distributed
over a neuronal tree. Branches of this tree go through different domains
of the brain. Moreover, branches can contain even neurons belonging the
spinal cord. Thus a branch can go from the cerebellum to the pons and then
to the medulla oblongata and finally through the spinal cord to the conus
medullaris. It is natural to include not only neurons, but also sensory re-
ceptors into neuronal trees (as belonging to the lowest level of hierarchical
neuronal trees). In such a model delocalization of a mental function increases
essentially.
Thus in our model not only the brain, but even the body participates in
the thinking process.
On the other hand, the hierarchical structure of our model provides a
rather sharp localization of a mental function f (as a consequence of associa-
tive processing). The state α0 of the root-neuron plays the crucial role. The
states of neurons of the fist level are less important and so on.
We proposed the distributed model of processing of information in the
brain with hierarchical localization.
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11.3 Binding problem
This problem is also well known in neurophysiology, neuroinformatics and
cognitive sciences, see, e.g., Revonsuo and Newman, 1999, Thiele and Stoner,
2003, Zimmer et al, 2006, for discussions and possible solutions. In our ap-
proach the binding problem was solved on the morphological level. The fun-
damental units of information processing in the brain are not single neurons
(or even localized neuronal populations), but hierarchical neuronal trajecto-
ries. The presence of the hierarchical structure on these neuronal trajectories
solves some problems of binding, e.g., the problem of consistency of time
scales. By operating with associations determined by short initial segments
of hierarchical neuronal trajectories (and not with detailed mental images de-
termined by the whole hierarchical neuronal trajectories) the brain uses only
the top part of a neuronal tree. Such a computational architecture minimizes
essentially the time of processing, cf. applications to image recognition and
compression, Benois-Pineau et. al, 2001, Khrennikov and Kotovich, 2002,
Khrennikov, Kotovich, and Borzistaya, 2004.
11.4 The problem of invariance of mental images
How can my brain recognize the image of my lovely woman? She can be
dressed in different ways, she can express totally different emotions (from
great pleasure to terrible scandals ), and so on. In our model the invariance
is achieved through using the association-representation. Only the states of
neurons belonging to the top levels of a neuronal tree (which is responsi-
ble for for the image of my lovely woman) are important in recognition.
Temporary differences are represented by lower levels, cf. with m-adic im-
age recognition algorithms Benois-Pineau et. al, 2001, Khrennikov and Ko-
tovich, 2002, Khrennikov, Kotovich, and Borzistaya, 2004.
12 Consequences for psychology and neuropsy-
chology
Our model gives the possibility to perform mathematical simulation of psy-
chological behaviour. We performed geometrization of psychology, geometro-
psychology. By introducing a mathematical model of mental space we incor-
porated psychology into the same rigorous mathematical framework as it was
done in physics by Newton and Hamilton. The crucial point is that geome-
tries of physical and mental spaces differ very much. The presence of the
rigid hierarchical structure plays the fundamental role in the m-adic mathe-
matical model of mental space.
Hierarchical representations are well accepted in psychology. Our model
provides the corresponding mathematical basis.
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By coupling the m-adic mental space with neuronal trees we constructed
a bridge between neurophysiology and psychology. Thus our model can be
considered as a contribution to neuropsychology.
We applied them-adic mental model to mathematical modeling of Freud’s
psychoanalysis. We aware about diversity of views on Freud’s psychoanal-
ysis in modern psychology, see, e.g., Macmillan, 1997, Gay, 1988, Young-
Bruehl, 1998 as well as Stein et al., 2006, Solms, M., 2006a, 2006b, for
debates. Our model supports the view which was presented in the journal
“Neuro-psychoanalysis:”
It would be possible to create an ongoing dialogue with the aim of recon-
ciling psychoanalytic and neuroscientific perspectives on the mind. This goal
is based on the assumption that these two historically divided disciplines are
ultimately pursuing the same task, namely, “attempt[ing] to make the com-
plications of mental functioning intelligible by dissecting the function and as-
signing its different constituents to different component parts of the [mental]
apparatus,” Freud, 1900, p. 536. Notwithstanding the fact that psychoanal-
ysis and neuroscience have approached this important scientific task from
radically different perspectives, the underlying unity of purpose has become
increasingly evident in recent years as neuroscientists have begun to investi-
gate those “complications of mental functioning” that were traditionally the
preserve of psychoanalysts. This has produced an explosion of new insights
into problems of vital interest to psychoanalysis, but these insights have not
been reconciled with existing psychoanalytic theories and models.
We can complete this manifest by the remark that neurophysiology has
an essentially higher level of the mathematical representation than traditional
psychoanalysis. Therefore coupling of psychoanalysis with neurophysiol-
ogy provides new perspectives in mathematization of psychoanalysis. Our
m-adic model serves precisely to such a purpose. Starting with a model of
the neuronal structure of the brain, hierarchical neuronal trees, we created
the m-adic model of mental space. This model was then applied to mathe-
matical modeling of psychoanalysis. The m-adic distance on mental space
is the basis of forming of measures of interest and interdiction and conse-
quently hidden forbidden wishes and, finally, symptoms and hysteries. And
this m-adic distance on mental space is induced by the neuronal structures –
hierarchical neuronal trees. There would be no psychical problems without
mental hierarchy in the brain. Psychical problems is the price for advantages
of hierarchical processing of information in the brain.
13 Possible consequences for medicine/psychiatry
Our model provides an interesting explanation of differences in psychical
consequences of the same events and mental experiences. Already Freud
pointed our to the role of such differences in forming of symptoms. The
same mental experience could play a minor role and it would be immediately
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forgotten by one person and it could be the starting point a hard psychical
illness for another person, Freud, 1933.
In our model this differences in psychical reactions to the same mental ex-
perience are explained by the scheme of mental architecture which is based
on blocking thresholds (such a threshold model is of course based on the
presence of the ultrametric structure on the mental space). If this hypothesis
were confirmed by clinical investigations, there will be opened new ways for
mental treatment. There can be developed both chemical and psychoanalytic
methods for changing the magnitudes of blocking thresholds. To develop
chemical methods of treatment, we should find the neurophysiological basis
of blocking thresholds. There can be also developed psychoanalytic meth-
ods for changing the magnitudes of blocking thresholds. By special training
patients can learn to operate with blocking thresholds of lower or higher mag-
nitudes. If a patient were able to make his blocking thresholds smaller, some
hidden forbidden wishes would come to the consciousness. On the one hand,
his conscious mental life would become essentially more complicated. On
the other hand, some symptoms would disappear. If a patient were able to
make his blocking thresholds larger, his mental (and in particular, emotional)
behavior would become more plane. It could be important for treatment of
patients with aggressive and destructive behavior. Such learning procedures
could be based on the brain-computer interface approach.
14 Possible consequences for artificial life
Investigations on artificial intelligence are oriented mainly to creation of ar-
tificial systems for motion in physical space and performing various tasks in
this space, e.g., creation of robots.11 Our m-adic hierarchical model provides
possibility for simulation of human psychology. In principle, on the basis of
our model artificial intellectual systems can be created. They would live rich
emotional life: numerous interesting ideas, constraints, forbidden ideas, hid-
den forbidden wishes, feedback control based on them, symptoms and finally
psychical problems, including hysteries. Such artificial intellectual systems
would be able to love (of course, only at the mental level), they could have
various psychical illnesses. How can we use such psychological robots?
We can test on such psychological robots different models of mental ar-
chitecture, for example, our hypothesis on blocking thresholds as well as our
general hierarchical model. Creation of populations of psychological robots
gives the possibility for simulation of complex socio-psychological life.
Conclusion. A mathematical model for hierarchical encoding of mental
information was created. Mental space (a mental analog of physical space)
is realized as an m-adic tree. Processing of mental information is realized by
11Of course, artificial intelligence activity is not restricted to robots. We can mention creation of
chess playing machines.
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dynamical systems on such a tree. Interplay between unconscious and con-
scious information flows generates interesting psychological behavior. Con-
sequences for neurophysiology, neuroinformatics, and cognitive sciences as
well as for psychology and neuropsychology, and even medicine/psychiatry
and artificial (“psychological robots”) were discussed. The m-adic hierar-
chical model of processing of mental information plays the role of the uni-
fying mathematical basis for a number of various neurophysiological, neu-
roinformatical and cognitive models of brain’s functioning.
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